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 I	
Management Summary 
A carefully considered pricing can effectively influence the success of almost any 
business. However, entrepreneurs who lack the necessary knowhow often structure 
pricings in a more intuitive manner. This thesis aims to compare a pricing established 
under these circumstances to a specifically designed theory-based pricing, working out 
differences and reflect on missed business potential. Furthermore, it is discussed if the 
applied method is applicable in practice. 
 
In order to find out, first an explicit pricing structure is successively created based on 
the principles of the price discrimination theory and the prospect theory. To reduce the 
complexity and facilitate objectivity a sequential approach is applied so the reader can 
follow the investigative procedure step by step. Secondly, the pricing based on theory is 
presented and compared to an example in practice. The identified differences are 
critically discussed to answer the formulated research questions. Consequentially, the 
pricing of a technology-based start-up is used for comparison to exemplify the situation 
of inexperienced entrepreneurs.  
 
The analysis results in a pricing consisting of a menu of two-part tariffs targeting high 
and low demand customers. The dynamic pricing aspect of the two-part tariff allows the 
start-up to not only differentiate and discriminate between the two customer groups but 
also among individual customers within the respective group. However, as customers 
can choose the product bundles themselves, the pricing components are designed with a 
focus on preventing demand transferability. Considering both theories, three product 
bundles are suggested accompanied by additional measures, which make use of 
anchoring and framing effects.  
 
The final comparison reveals, that even though the start-up is already successfully price 
discriminating the current pricing is too complex and lacks a variable aspect linked to 
the usage of the core product. This can potentially lead to missed profit through demand 
transferability, lost customer orders or the inability to detect the maximum willingness 
to pay. Currently, the start-up depends only on the ability of their sales representatives 
to prevent the mentioned failures from happening. This causes higher costs in terms of 
	 II 
staff training as well as a higher dependability on certain employees. Accordingly, the 
overall potential scalability of the business suffers.  
 
The chosen approach shows on one hand that a pricing designed in practice did not lead 
to an optimal pricing scheme. Hence, theory can help to better structure and optimize 
the pricing in practice. On the other hand however the attempt to only focus on theory 
and not implement a practical perspective would be not optimal either. Contradictions 
among the chosen theories limit a mere theoretical approach. However, the combination 
of theory and practice, how it is presented in this thesis, can lead to worthwhile 
outcomes and could be used as an example for other entrepreneurs. 
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1. Introduction  
The introductory chapter presents the topic, the research questions, the method as well 
as the underlying case analysed in this work. It marks the drivers behind the research 
questions and shortly states reasons for the choice of the theoretical frameworks. Even 
though these aspects are highlighted the applied method (discussed in chapter 1.2.) 
implies that certain components of the theory and additional containments reveal it 
selves as soon as the respective context in the analytical process requests it.  
 
1.1. Topic introduction and research questions 
A carefully considered pricing model can be of high value as it can effectively and 
sustainably influence the success of almost every business in a positive way. At the 
same time, it represents a challenging task as the approaches for structuring a pricing 
are numerous and no single right way exists. Especially young entrepreneurs who lack 
experience in business could run into difficulties when facing this task. This increases 
the risk of mistakes, which could result in missed profit. However, one option for 
creating an optimal pricing model would be through a scientifically based analysis. In 
day-to-day business however the time and resources for such an in-depth analysis are 
scarcely ever available. Thus, pricings in practice are created and optimized through a 
rather intuitive and iterative process. This raises a twofold question: First what 
differences can be identified between a theory-based and a practical pricing and second 
can missed business potential be detected when reflecting on the appearing differences. 
When answering these questions it furthermore allows to generate insights on how the 
optimal pricing according to the theory would look and how feasible the method of 
creating an exclusively theory-based pricing is. 
In order to find out, a pricing based on two economic theories is step by step 
constructed and then compared to an already existing pricing in practice. Furthermore, 
for exemplifying the situation of young entrepreneurs using a rather intuitive pricing 
process, it will be a pricing structure of a start-up being used for comparison. 
Consequentially, the applied theories are related to the market situation and business 
needs of the start-up: First, the theory of price discrimination will be used as the start-up 
does posses a dominating market position and second, the prospect theory 
complementing the former through its practical insights in purchasing decision 
situations.  
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1.2. Research method and limitations 
After describing the case of the start-up Poinz GmbH (hereinafter called 'poinz') in 1.3. 
the theoretical base of the price discrimination theory will be introduced at the 
beginning of the second chapter. It will mainly be formed by the work of Arthur C. 
Pigou (1920), J. Robinson (1969). and J. Tirole (1988). The defined borders and key 
implications then guide the definition of a first potential pricing structure in 2.1.3. In 
chapter 2.2. the procedure of introducing the theory first and applying it thereafter will 
be repeated with implications of the prospect theory outlined by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). The main focus will be laid on the concepts of 'Anchoring' and 'Framing'. 
Generally, reasons and justifications for the choice of each concept as well as the 
mentioning of limitations will be further discussed in the respective chapters 2.1 and 
2.2. However, both analyses will first be undertaken independently of each other and 
with no further reference to the existing pricing model of the start-up. Nonetheless, after 
working out the implications of both theories, the results will be combined in chapter 
2.3. and one pricing model suggested. This final pricing will then be compared to the 
status quo of the start-up in chapter 2.4. In a next step, appearing differences as well as 
similarities will be worked out and critically discussed, especially if, from the 
perspective of poinz, business potential was missed. Finally, in the discussion in chapter 
3, a critical reflection on the applied method as well as a final assessment of poinz 
regarding the missed business potential will be formulated.  
 
By focusing on each theory independently the analytical process is transparently 
revealed and prevents certain biases from influencing the analysis. The sequential 
approach additionally helps to reduce complexity and aims for objectivity as the reader 
can follow the analytical procedure step by step. The need for transparency and 
objectivity gains further importance as the analyst of this work is engaged as Chief 
Operating Officer and shareholder of poinz.  
Furthermore, the method of creating a full pricing as a basis for comparison is assumed 
to yield more meaningful results than a more abstract approach. Mainly, because 
pricings often relate to singularities of the respective business and therefore differ from 
case to case. Hence, a specially made pricing enables a more precise comparison.  
Nevertheless, it is not the goal of this paper to consider the whole scope of pricing 
research and question them from a theoretical point of view. The chances rather lay in 
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the comprehensible use of pricing theories for a practical application. Overcoming 
contradictions between the two theories, which are limited to the theoretical space only, 
can therefore be justified if it does not reasonably interfere with the goals of the start-up 
in practice. However, it will be in the last part of the thesis where the limitations and the 
chances of the chosen approach are further discussed. 
 
1.3. Case introduction - the start-up poinz 
The following chapter helps to understand the main drivers behind the pricing model of 
poinz and its overall business environment. The information displayed before 
introducing the pricing structure will support the understanding of the specific pricing 
design and certain assumptions made in the subsequent second chapter.    
 
Founded in 2012 in Zurich, as of March 2017 poinz has employed ten full time 
employees and two technical experts. Because of the innovative nature of the product 
and the foundation in 2012 poinz is considered to be an innovation driven start-up 
(Eidgenössische Steuerverwaltung ESTV, 2013). Poinz developed a free smartphone 
application (hereinafter called 'App') for private individuals (hereinafter called 'user/s') 
as well as a web tool and business services for its business customers (hereinafter called 
'customer/s'). The App helps users to store loyalty cards of local businesses on their 
smartphone. Such loyalty cards are mainly seen in restaurants or cinemas where 
businesses give one free unit after consumers have bought a certain number of units 
(e.g. buy ten menus, get the eleventh for free). The App helps users to increase 
convenience by lowering the amount of paper loyalty cards in their briefcase as well as 
saving money by receiving discounts and coupons (Poinz GmbH, 2016). Customers on 
the other hand can retain consumers (users) more effectively, can send messages and 
promotions to the users' smartphone and measure the success of the marketing 
campaign through an analytical web tool (Poinz GmbH, 2016).  
 
Business model 
As a platform, which hosts multiple loyalty campaigns for different local businesses, 
poinz faces users of the App on one side and their customers (businesses) on the other 
side. Poinz is therefore regarded to be a so-called 'two sided business'. Despite the fact 
that both parties are crucial for the start-ups' success the users are not charged with any 
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fee. However the customers are charged a yearly recurring fee for using poinz as their 
customer retention platform. The business model further relies on the promotion 
activities of the business customers. As every business customer has an incentive to 
promote its own loyalty campaign, poinz gains reputation from the generated 
downloads of the App used to store the loyalty cards. The business model of poinz is 
further strengthened through a 'lock in' effect for users and customers alike. The more 
loyalty cards a user stores on his smartphone the lower the probability that he or she 
stops using the App and the more user a customer of poinz has the more unlikely it 
becomes that he leaves the poinz platform.  
 
Market situation 
As of March 2017 poinz defines its target customer as a small or medium sized 
(hereinafter called 'SME') retail, service or gastronomy-company in an area of high 
population density in the German speaking part of Switzerland. The target customer has 
preferably a product with a high degree of substitutability, which is sold at relatively 
high frequency (e.g. cinema ticket, lunch menu, low priced fashion goods etc.). Poinz 
acts as a specialised company in a niche market with a clear focus on loyalty services on 
mobile phones in Switzerland. This specialization led to the actual market leader 
position with its 250'000 Users and 1200 Partner locations (Poinz GmbH, 2016). As a 
result of the strong customer network with nationwide, famous brands, the barriers to 
still successfully enter this specific market are high. The more partner sign up to the 
platform the more user benefit from it and the more user are requesting the app, the 
more partner want to sign up. This self-reinforcing structure fosters the market leader 
position even further. The only main competitor, the post finance subsidiary 'Profit 
App', went out of business as per end of 2016. As a result, poinz is now considered to 
be an effective monopoly. This aspect will be referred to and discussed in more detail in 
the analysis in chapter 2.1.1. where the role of a monopoly is further introduced.  
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Cost drivers 
The fragmented structure of the SME-market in Switzerland is the driving force behind 
the cost structure of poinz. As small retail, service or gastronomy-companies do not 
have a single point to reach out to, every business partner has to be acquired separately. 
Additonally, the entrepreneurs behind the business are often faced with time constraints 
when it comes to marketing activities because of the requesting task of leading a small 
business in a competitive environment. As a result, the acquisition, initialisation and 
relationship management of the single business is a time and people intense task for 
poinz. The main fix costs poinz faces are therefore related to its human capital. The fix 
costs occur independently of the size of the acquired partner or the specific service 
package bought (see next chapter for more information on pricing). The importance of 
customer acquisition leads poinz to focus on the key cost indicator 'CAC' (customer 
acquisition cost), which shows what the acquisition of a customer costs. It is calculated 
by dividing all direct sales and marketing expenses in one specific period by the number 
of customers acquired in this specific period. The estimated CAC for poinz in 2017 is 
CHF 550. The CAC will also be referred to as 'the marginal cost' of poinz and will be 
further outlined in chapter two. For the analysis later in this work it is further assumed 
that the overall cost structure is given and stable.   
 
1.3.1. Existing pricing strategy of poinz  
The following introduction to the pricing model helps to further understand the business 
practices of poinz and represents the base for the comparison in the last part of this 
work. However, the existing pricing structure (also referred to as 'status quo') does not 
further influence or connect to the separate analysis based on the price discrimination 
theory or prospect theory in chapter two. 
 
The pricing consists of recurring yearly fees. To simplify the decision-making process 
four predefined packages (see Table 1 belwo) suggest possible product bundles to the 
potential customer. The packages do not specifically target a certain industry but are 
linked to considerations on different budget constraints of potential customers. Prices 
are charged per sales location and discounted by 10% for customers with more than two 
sales locations and by 20% with more than five sales locations. Besides small discounts 
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incentivising a fast decision of the potential customer no further permanent discounts 
are installed. Currently, the following product bundles are available: 
 
Budget Light Standard Pro 
 
One Loyalty 
campaign 
 
No statistics 
 
 
 
Unlimited loyalty 
campaigns 
 
Campaign statistics 
 
Unlimited loyalty 
campaigns 
 
Campaign statistics 
 
Limited 
Communication 
function (up to 3000 
messages) 
 
Unlimited loyalty 
campaigns 
 
Campaign statistics 
 
Unlimited 
Communication 
function 
 
Consulting 
mandate 
 
CHF 390 p.a. CHF 780 p.a. CHF 1200 p.a. CHF 2000 p.a. 
 
Table 1: The current pricing of poinz consisting of four product bundles with functionalities acting as differentiator.  
 
Even though the fix yearly fees do vary in price significantly it does not cost poinz more 
to add or leave out certain product features. The digital nature of the product allows for 
differentiation between customers and scalability at no further costs. Especially the 
communication function is differing the lower priced bundles 'Budget' and 'Light' from 
the higher pried bundles 'Standard' and 'Pro. An exception marks the consulting 
mandate in the 'Pro' package requesting further human resources to be served hence 
higher costs.  
 
On the Website poinz does only display the lowest price (Budget, see Table 2) broken 
down to the monthly amount (Poinz GmbH, 2016) and preferably visits their customers 
on site to discuss the suitable product bundle. The intention of this practice is to first 
draw the interest of any potential customers to then identify and sell the highest possible 
bundle for each customer on site and thus maximize revenue.  
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Furthermore, poinz stated that an initial market research was undertaken when the 
company was founded to approximate a certain price level. However, no consultations 
of scientific approaches prior to the design of the pricing were undertaken. Changes in 
prices were mainly considered based on an iterative process guided by qualitative 
feedback of sales representatives. However, no fundamental changes were undertaken 
since the pricing was installed in 2012. The reflection on the pricing structure and the 
underlying drivers will be discussed in chapter 2.3., 2.4. ('pricing comparison') and 3 
('Discussion'). 
 
2. Methods and results - Creating a theory-based pricing and 
compare it to an example in practice 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter represents the core aspect of the work. While the 
first part will focus on the price discrimination theory, the second part will cover the 
implications of prospect theory for a pricing model for poinz. The respective sub-
chapters 2.1. and 2.2. will always introduce the reader to the theoretical aspects of the 
chosen theories first and apply it to the pricing model thereafter. The theoretical parts 
should help to set a common understanding of the theories and not deepen or question 
them fundamentally. Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, it is important to 
note that the existing pricing structure of poinz should not further influence the 
structuring of the theory-based pricing. It is assumed that no current pricing exists and 
demand structures of potential customers are not known in advance. This set pre-
condition helps to realistically simulate the situation entrepreneurs find themselves in 
when designing a pricing. However, in chapter 2.3., the pricing structure based on price 
discrimination theory from 2.1. will be combined with the insights gained from the 
prospect theory in chapter 2.2. The last part contains the final results in form of a 
comparison between the current pricing of poinz and the established pricing structure 
from 2.3. 
  
2.1. Creating a pricing through price discrimination theory 
The goal of this chapter is to introduce the price discrimination theory, state the 
necessary boundaries related to the goal of this work and applying it to design a pricing 
for poinz. However, before introducing the reader to the core theory of price 
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discrimination, underlying additional concepts are explained, enabling a better 
understanding of the core framework thereafter. The final application of the theory will 
be undertaken in chapter 2.1.3 followed by additional remarks on certain boundaries 
and assumptions effecting the pricing in practice.  
 
2.1.1. Additional concepts underlying the price discrimination theory 
The interpretation and understanding of the standard economic model, the willingness 
to pay and the definition of monopolies must be understood before introducing the price 
discrimination theory. The following chapters thus highlight some theoretical aspects as 
well as insights on how they should be linked to the start-ups' situation and the pricing 
design thereafter. It also represents the foundation for the understanding of why and 
when price discrimination could be applied in practice. However, possible critique and 
reflections on the suitability of certain assumptions are not further outlined in this part 
but taken on in the 'Discussion' in chapter 3. 
 
Standard economic model and willingness to pay 
The standard economic model constructs the situation of economic agents (hereinafter 
referred to as 'customers' of poinz) facing purchase decision situations. The model 
constitutes that every customer tries to maximize the utility under the constraint of the 
available budget. In the case of poinz, utility is referred to the satisfaction customers 
derive from buying a certain product bundle. It therefore represents a subjective value 
limited by the financial possibilities of the customer. It is assumed that in every decision 
making situation the customer acts rational and therefore chooses the optimal 
combination between the perceived satisfaction and the amount spent (Mankiw & 
Taylor, 2014, p. 102). However, every buyer facing this trade off has to think of a 
concrete price he is willing to pay for the product. The monetary value (the price) of the 
utility (subjective value of the good) represents the customers 'willingness to pay' 
(Mankiw & Taylor, 2014, p. 102f.). Hence, poinz has to always consider what 
perceived value their products trigger, what financial constraints the customers face and 
thus what price the customers are willing to pay. The concept of the 'willingness to pay' 
will play an important role in the following chapters on price discrimination as well as 
prospect theory in chapter 2.2. 
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Poinz as an effective monopoly 
The definition of a monopoly is diametrically opposed by the construct of a company in 
perfect competition. It is referred to a company with the market power to dictate prices 
to the consumers' and not forced to adapt prices because of competitive forces. Poinz 
does not face competing products or services, which consumers could use as 
substitution. Furthermore, the self-reinforcing mechanism of their business model, 
explained in the introduction, enables high entry barriers. As a result, 'price giving' 
powers can be assumed and poinz therefore considered an effective monopoly (Mankiw 
& Taylor, 2014, p. 290). However, it is not clear if products in other markets could 
influence the demand structure of the market. To simplify the analytical process it is 
assumed that other markets do not influence demand.  
Under these circumstances poinz can by definition maximize its profits by dictating a 
price, which allows absorbing remaining consumer surplus. The latter is referred to be 
the sum of the positive differences between a price paid for an economic good and the 
customers' actual willingness to pay (see 'A' in figure 1). Hence, if poinz is able to 
charge the exact price every single consumer is willing to pay, a maximization of profits 
would be achieved (in Figure 1 'A'  + 'B' + 'C'). 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of monopolistic market situation. 
Price  
Marginal costs curve  
Demand curve  
Marginal revenue 
curve  
Marginal cost 
Monopoly price 
A 
A = Consumer surplus B = Deadweight loss C = Monopoly profit   
B C 
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2.1.2. Theoretical framework of the price discrimination theory for poinz 
By definition, a company engages in price discrimination if it is able to charge different 
prices for the same economic good (Tirole, 1988, p. 133). It is core to note that 
differences in prices expressing differences in costs are not considered price 
discriminating (Tirole, 1988, p. 133f). However, the differentiation of products (e.g. 
first and second class tickets in trains) resulting in different prices can be used as an 
instrument to discriminate between consumers (Robinson, 1969, p. 180). 
Consequentially, it is a compulsory requirement that a company that wants to engage in 
price discrimination is able to dictate prices and does not have to adapt to prices of the 
competition (Robinson, 1969, p. 179). Poinz is not only considered to be an effective 
monopoly but has also the chance to discriminate successfully because of its favourable 
cost structure and the digital nature of the product. The former is, among others, 
expressed by the customer acquisition cost of CHF 550 representing the 'marginal cost' 
of the monopolist (see figure 2). The latter aspect by the fact that product variations do 
not ultimately yield higher costs for the start-up and therefore enables effective 
discrimination. However, making use of this favourable position is linked to certain 
difficulties. Incomplete information about customers demand structures as well as the 
possibility that market participants optimize the suggested product bundles (risk of 
transferability see below) complicate price discrimination (Tirole, 1988, p. 134f.). These 
difficulties lead to different strategies on how to design a pricing in an optimal way. In 
the following sections the difficulties alongside with suggested strategies will be further 
explained. 
 
Possibility of commodity and demand transferability  
As stated above the success of price discrimination is hindered by the possibility of 
consumers escaping the price dictation of a monopolists pricing model (Tirole, 1988, p. 
134). In theory, escaping the price dictation is referred to as 'transferability' or 'arbitrage' 
(Tirole, 1988, p. 134). The higher the amount of arbitrage possibilities, the more 
difficult it becomes for the monopolist to discriminate. Hence, as the conditions for 
poinz to price discriminate are given, arbitrage must be circumvented (Pigou, 1920, p. 
240). The following two sub-chapters highlight the two main arbitrage possibilities and 
reflect on their possible impact on the pricing design of poinz. 
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Transferability of commodity 
Where a physical good is involved the risk for the monopolist that consumers optimize 
prices between each other exists. Commodity arbitrage happens when a customer buys 
at a low price and resells it to another consumer, which would pay a higher price when 
buying from the monopolist directly (Tirole, 1988, p. 134). However, digital products as 
well as services can hardly be bought and resold (Robinson, 1969, p. 180). This fact 
prevents this sort of arbitrage from happening in the case of poinz. Therefore, the risk of 
commodity arbitrage is not further considered in. 
 
Transferability of demand 
In the absence of physical goods however consumers are able to escape discrimination 
by choosing a cheaper product bundle or service package compared to their willingness 
to pay (Tirole, 1988, p. 134f.). If poinz would create product bundles to charge different 
prices the risk is intact that certain customers choose a cheaper package not designed for 
them in the first place (Tirole, 1988, p. 135). If this happens poinz fails to charge the 
maximum price the customer would be willing to pay and misses out on possible profit. 
Compared to the transferability of commodity the risk for demand transferability is 
intact and must be considered in pricing design for poinz. Theory suggests a highly 
effective segmentation (linked to a large amount of information about customer 
demand) or customers self-selecting their product bundle as a counter measure (Tirole, 
1988, p. 135). These aspects will be further discussed in pricing design in chapter 2.1.3. 
 
Different levels of price discrimination 
Following Pigou (1920), there are three main strategies to maximize the profit of the 
monopolist using price discrimination (Pigou, 1920, p. 240ff.). In accordance with the 
stated method in the introduction all three types are theoretically explained yet at the 
same time put into the context of designing a pricing for poinz in the chapter 2.1.3. 
 
First-degree price discrimination 
First-degree price discrimination is also referred to as 'perfect price discrimination' as 
the monopolist is theoretically able to absorb the entire customer surplus (Tirole, 1988, 
p. 135). For achieving this degree of discrimination a monopolist would have to charge 
n different prices to n different consumers with n different demand curves (Robinson, 
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1969, p. 186). Even though Pigou (1920) states that this type of discrimination is 
"scarcely ever practicable" (Pigou, 1920, p. 245) the start-up poinz would have to 
consider engaging in this type of discrimination at least to a certain extent. Mainly 
because Pigou (1920) complements his remarks by stating that perfect discrimination 
could be possible if "detailed separate bargaining with every separate customer" would 
or could be undertaken (Pigou, 1920, p. 245). As a start-up, poinz enjoys a certain 
amount of flexibility and agility and thus could be able to engage in such a strategy. 
However, the costs of it in terms of coordination and administration should not be 
underestimated and be taken into account. Furthermore, Tirole (1988) outlines an 
additional problem poinz would have to deal with when implementing a prefect price 
discrimination strategy: The incomplete information about the effective individual 
willingness to pay poinz possesses in practice (Tirole, 1988, p. 135). How these aspects 
should be approached will be further outlined in the concrete analysis in chapter 2.1.3.  
 
Second-degree price discrimination 
One possibility for tackling incomplete information on customers' willingness to pay is 
letting them self-select a pre-set of product bundles themselves (Tirole, 1988, p. 143). 
In a more abstract way, Pigou (1920) formulates the optimal price / product bundle 
under the second type of discrimination as an offering where consumers who are willing 
to pay a price higher than X, self-select price X and all other consumers only willing to 
pay less than X, but more than Y, choose price Y (Pigou, 1920, p. 244). The challenge of 
this method is the division of the market into optimal sub-markets for the creation of 
optimal product bundles. It has to be taken into account that if the attempt of 
segmenting customers and create optimal product bundles accordingly fails, customers 
will be able to transfer themselves in "wrong" product bundles not created for them in 
the first place (Robinson, 1969, p. 187). However, for the pricing design this sort of 
discrimination strategy must be considered, as poinz will not be able to gain perfect 
information about customer demand in advance. Nevertheless, as demand transferability 
is possible, measures preventing it must be applied when designing the pricing 
structure.  
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Third-degree price discrimination 
Third-degree price discrimination is differing itself from the second degree by using a 
direct signal regarding the demand of the customer to create product bundles matching 
each specified customer group. Whilst the second degree is relying on the self-selecting 
consumer the third degree anticipates certain factors like age, occupation or location of 
the customer to segment and charge different prices (Tirole, 1988, p. 135). As a result, 
the optimal combination of markets would be a combination where missed consumer 
surplus is minimized through an infinite range of precise sub-markets where the lowest 
demand price of the highest segment exceeds the highest demand price of the following 
one (Pigou, 1920, p. 246). However, as poinz can technically not split its market into 
infinite, distinct groups there will always be consumers in one group theoretically 
willing and able to pay for a more expensive product bundle designed for another 
customer group. Hence, poinz would miss out on consumer surplus. Further refining 
this sort of discrimination with n different customer groups for n different demand 
structures would at one point come close to the first degree in terms of complexity 
(Robinson, 1969, p. 186). As a result the third type will play a minor role in the 
following analysis as detailed information about customer groups are missing. 
Nonetheless, the possible combination of aspects assigned to the first, second and third 
type of discrimination will be further considered in the subsequent chapters. In the latter 
case it will be using exogenous signals to further define certain product bundles when 
information about demand structures are missing.  
 
2.1.3 Application of the price discrimination theory for a pricing in practice  
While the preceding chapters established the theoretical framework, this chapter will 
apply it and create a pricing structure for poinz. The first part constitutes the analytical 
frame for the pricing. Separate aspects that have to be considered in the concrete pricing 
design later on are labelled with numbers 1 to 6 in brackets and then summarized at the 
end of the section. This further structures and thus objectivizes the underlying analytical 
process. After the summary of the analytical frame the concrete pricing will be 
constructed and calculated. In the end additional limitations will be highlighted, 
concluding the already made assumptions. 
 
 
	 14 
Structural analysis of the price discrimination theory for the pricing of poinz 
Based on the explanation in the preceding chapter poinz should try to apply certain 
aspects of perfect price discrimination. The goal would be to gain a maximum amount 
of information about the customers' willingness to pay and to prevent demand 
transferability by influencing the customers' choice when meeting in person. As stated 
in the introductory chapter 1.3. poinz preferably visits every customer in person and 
does not display any further information on the pricing structure online. Hence, 
customers do not have the possibility to pre-select a price or discuss prices prior to the 
sales meeting, which supports the suggested approach (1). Nonetheless, it also limits the 
possibilities for dynamic online pricing, where dynamic prices are transparently shown 
online, which thus is not further considered. However, charging n different prices in n 
different bargaining situations would hardly be practicable on a large scale (Pigou, 
1920, p. 245). This statement is applicable to poinz as for example the training, 
incentivization and coordination of the sales team becomes more complex and 
expensive the larger it gets. Additionally, despite sophisticated sales trainings, no 
guarantee can be given that sales representatives are able to find out the exact 
willingness to pay when bargaining the individual price (Tirole, 1988, p. 134f.). In that 
context Pigou (1920) mentions the danger of bribery or other difficulties containing so 
many individual bargaining situations (Pigou, 1920, p. 245). As a result other pricing 
mechanisms must be put in place in the case of poinz. 
 
The second type of price discrimination addresses this problem. The self-selecting 
mechanism of the pricing structure could help discriminate in a more scalable manner 
(Tirole, 1988, p. 135). More precisely, it would set clear borders for the poinz sales 
meetings and reduce complexity in coordination and training. Tirole (1988) suggests 
two-part tariffs as a widespread and "simple" instrument for discrimination of this type 
(Tirole, 1988, p. 143). Applying two-part tariffs consumers do not only choose between 
different price bundles according to their willingness to pay but also pay a dynamic 
price linked to the individual usage of the product. This is achieved by combining a 
lump sum fee 'T' and a varying price 'p' charged per variable aspect 'q' of the product 
(2). However, because customers can select product bundles themselves a special focus 
must still be laid on the minimization of demand arbitrage (Tirole, 1988, p. 143). The 
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focus when choosing T, q and p must therefore lie on successfully differentiating 
different customer groups in a way arbitrage does not occur (3).  
According to Tirole (1988) different demand structures can be targeted better with a 
range than with just one tow-part tariff (Tirole, 1988, p. 148). To simplify the analytical 
process in regard to the limited time frame of this thesis and the limited information 
available on poinz customer groups it is assumed that only two customer segments are 
relevant: High and Low demand. In this case two price bundles 'T1 + (p x q)' 
(hereinafter called B1) and 'T2 + (p x q)' (hereinafter called B2) should be introduced 
(Tirole, 1988, p. 148) (4). The product bundle B1 would thus target the low, B2 the high 
demand customers. Furthermore, the lump-sum fee T1 attached to the product aspects in 
B1 must incorporate the lowest possible edge of the low-demand customers' 
requirements. This should firstly allow including as many (low-demand) customers as 
possible and second, in combination with the product features in B1, prevent the high 
demand customers from choosing the lower bundle (5) (Tirole, 1988, p. 148f.). 
Remaining consumer surplus should therefore be absorbed by p x q. However, what 
aspect should represent q and which price to charge for T or p depends on the customer 
groups demand structure. As in the context of this work it is assumed that no prior 
knowledge about the exact demand structure is available, the three variables T, q and p 
have to be approximated among others by available exogenous factors (6). In the 
context of this work the differentiation of low and high demand customers is therefore 
applied by combining product bundles based on the principles of the second type of 
discrimination and exogenous factors theoretically closer to the third type of price 
discrimination. 
In conclusion, the structural analysis above has resulted in six aspects that need to be 
considered and further developed for a concrete pricing scheme for poinz.  
 
Findings of structural analysis  
Combining the six aspects in the previous section poinz should present the product and 
the respective prices to every customer individually to detect the willingness to pay and 
minimize the risk of demand transferability (1). However, poinz should do this within 
boundaries provided by a certain pricing structure to reduce complexity, errors and cost 
that could occur when facing n different bargaining situations. A menu of two-part 
tariffs based on a lump-sum fee (T) and a variable price (p x q) should set these 
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boundaries (2). The structure of the two-part tariff must be set in a way high and low 
demand customers can be differentiated and discriminated (T1, T2) (4). Additionally, 
the combination of a fix and a variable price offers a possibility to minimize the risk of 
missed consumer surplus (3, 5). Nonetheless, poinz has to pre-set T, p and q based on 
exogenous factors of the target market with a focus on hindering demand transferability 
(6).  
 
Final pricing based on price discrimination theory  
In this section the composition of the product bundles B1 and B2, the corresponding 
lump sum fees T1 and T2 as well as the dynamic pricing aspect p x q are defined. The 
difficulty lies in designing the pricing without knowing the demand curve of high and 
low demand customers in advance. If such information would have been available 
(which however is mostly not the case in practice) one could have defined the 
willingness to pay of both customer groups and design a pricing accordingly. However, 
not knowing the demand curves yields certain problematic which must be targeted by an 
alternative approach: First, the product bundles B1 and B2 are composed to generate a 
general understanding of a low and high demand customers needs. The goal is to clearly 
differentiate a high- form a low-demand product bundle. Thereafter, the fixed tariffs T1 
and T2 are established accordingly. Due to the missing information on customer 
demand the cost structure of poinz as well as exogenous signals indicating certain 
budget constraints help to calculate the final prices. In the last part the composition of 
the dynamic aspect p x q does therefor try to balance an approximated product usage 
with a price that must be able to absorb a remaining but unknown consumer surplus. 
The specific difficulties are further discussed when appearing in the respective section.  
 
Bundle B1 and B2: Following the principles of price discrimination theory price 
differences between product bundles B1 and B2 should not be linked to additional cost 
for poinz yet justified by aspects of product differentiation. Robinson mentions the 
possibility of selling "a certain article which in fact is almost certainly alike (...) as 
different qualities under different names and labels (...)" to simply split up the market so 
"the monopolist can sell what is substantially the same thing at several prices" 
(Robinson, 1969, p. 181). Accordingly, poinz must add digital features not linked to 
higher costs and label the product bundles in ways demand transferability between high 
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and low demand customers becomes unlikely. Hence, the available product features 
must be combined in a way a high demand customer has no interest to buy the low 
demand bundle. Based on the information given on product functionalities one could 
suggest (and assume for further analysis) that following product bundles: 
 
Bundle 1, B1: Representing a basic package for low demand customers it should cover 
product features delivering enough perceived utility for a buying decision but at the 
same time not enough for the high demand customers. The latter should still perceive it 
as unattractive despite a notable price discount. To draw a stereotype of such a low 
demand customer choosing B1, one could imagine a single store with rather less 
customer frequency and revenue as well as limited human or financial resources unable 
to engage in well-structured marketing campaigns. The success of multiple loyalty 
campaigns as well as the usage of the communication feature would thus play a minor 
role in his considerations. The main feature of this package should hence be limited to 
the core function, digitalization of one loyalty card, as well as the possibility to track 
campaign successes statistically. Therefore, it is assumed that high demand customers 
with less budget constraints are the opposite of the drawn stereo type and use poinz for 
its additional functionality, the communication function as well as multiple loyalty 
campaigns, and do not transfer themselves into B1 accordingly.  
 
Bundle 2, B2: Consequentially, this bundle should be mainly differentiated by the 
communication function, which allows high demand customers to communicate with its 
loyal customer base. Additionally, the possibility of unlimited loyalty campaigns (e.g. 
one loyalty campaign on coffee and one on lunch menus) should be granted. As the 
resources (financial and human capital) of applying poinz successfully should be in 
place the loyalty program and the communication function should result in higher 
campaign success and thus further raise perceived utility hence willingness to pay.  
 
Tariff T1 and T2: Not knowing the demand structure of each customer group 
complicates the calculation process, especially because instruments like conjoint 
modelling or contingent valuation method for identifying the willingness to pay are out 
of the scope of this work. However, the issue of missing information could partially be 
compensated by considering exogenous factors for approximating differences in 
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willingness to pay (see also point 6 in previous section). In the case of poinz the 
following factors are assumed viable to help differentiating low and high demand 
customers and calculate prices accordingly: The size of the customer (a) (the more sales 
locations, the higher the purchasing power), frequency of purchases at customers' 
location (b) (the higher de frequency, the more financial success and the higher the 
likelihood of a suitable product for loyalty cards hence higher willingness to pay), 
success of retention programs (c) (assuming suitable products for loyalty cards and 
well-done marketing execution hence higher willingness to pay) as well as the financial 
stability of the potential customer (d) (the higher the respective margins of certain 
customer groups, the lower the budget constraint, hence higher willingness to pay). 
Whilst the first aspect a will be covered separately, the factors b and c will be targeted 
by the dynamic pricing aspect p x q and described in the respective section below. 
However, as p x q is considered capable of absorbing an unknown amount of consumer 
surplus (see introduction of this chapter above), T1 and T2 could focus on the budgetary 
aspect d. In sum, poinz could differentiate high and low demand customers in regard to 
the available budget through T first and then further discriminate within the respective 
customer group based on actual usage of the product through p x q. 
 
Tariff 1, T1: As stated in the previous sub-chapter (point 5 in the structural analysis), 
targeting financially limited customers by charging the lowest possible fix price is 
justifiable because a maximum amount of low demand customers could be included and 
consumer surplus absorbed through the dynamic pricing aspect. In the case of poinz the 
marginal cost of CHF 550 represents the lowest possible price. By setting T1 at CHF 
550 poinz could acquire a maximum amount of low demand customers while still 
covering all acquisition costs and absorbing consumer surplus by p x q alone.  
 
Tariff 2, T2: An optimal tariff T2 should be set slightly above the highest price a low-
demand customer is willing to pay (T1 + p x q) but low enough so that a large amount 
of high demand customers considering B2 are able and willing to pay for it. To 
approximate budget limitations one could break down the target market in segments 
with the intention to find similarities in financial capability of each segment. Hence, 
considering the three relevant industries according to poinz (retail, service and 
gastronomy), an approximation of willingness to pay could be undertaken by comparing 
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the respective industry margins. Margins are considered suitable as it indicates the 
relative possibility of remaining financial resources irrespective of absolute differences 
linked to the respective industry (e.g. revenue, price level etc.). According to the SME 
report 2016 of the FHS St. Gallen the mentioned industries enjoy an approximated 
mean EBIT margin of 6.5% (retail), 7.5% (service) and 4% (gastronomy) respectively 
(FHS St. Gallen Institut für Unternehmensführung IFU - FHS, 2014). Even though 
these calculations have to be seen as approximations one can now derive relative 
differences in possible remaining budgets of each customer group: Among the relevant 
industries gastronomy seems to represent the segment with the highest budget 
constraints, followed by retail with a 62.5% higher margin (relative difference from 4% 
to 6.5%) and service industry with a 15% higher margin than retail (relative difference 
from 6.5% to 7.5%). Now assuming that gastronomy with the weakest financial pattern 
of all industries is likely to represent most of the customers matching the stereotype 
linked to B1 (see above), their lump sum fee would be set at CHF 550 (T1). As the next 
target industry after gastronomy is enjoying a substantially higher margin (retail) one 
could assume that a large part of the customers could afford T2 and because of the 
higher utility of the bundle also prefer B2 to B1. Consequentially, if customers with the 
lowest margins must be able to afford T1, poinz could assume that customers from the 
next higher industry act accordingly and raise T1 by 62.5% to set the fixed fee T2 at 
CHF 895.  
However, this calculation should not indicate that the product bundle B1 is only 
designed for gastronomy and B2 only for service companies. It represents an 
approximation of customer groups with structurally higher or lower budget constraints. 
It is therefor also assumed that low performing service or retail companies (with lower 
profit margins) choose B1 or high performing gastronomy companies (with higher 
margins) choose B2. This is in line with the inability of the available product features 
within bundles B1 and B2, to specifically target certain industries. The product features 
could, as an example, not be adjusted so only gastronomy companies are justifiably 
allowed to use it. Hence, focusing on margins and not on specific industries when 
discriminating is considered to be the better instrument to prevent demand 
transferability and maximize profit among different customers. Consequentially, no 
separate tariff for service companies must be introduced as consumer surplus is 
absorbed by the additional fee 'p x q' without complicating the pricing structure any 
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further. In conclusion, the product bundle B2 with fixed tariff T2 is targeting customers 
of all industries with a structurally higher willingness to pay (lower budget constraint) 
starting at CHF 895 complemented with p x q for differences in demand within the high 
demand segment. 
 
Quantity discount: As mentioned above, for T1 and T2 likewise, poinz can assume that 
the mere size of a company can further indicate a higher willingness to pay of potential 
customers (see factor 'a' above). Hence, more sales locations equal a higher buying 
power. As it does not cost more to sign up an additional location of the same customer 
(digital product) poinz should charge prices (T1, T2) per location and not per contract 
signed (e.g. one customer with five sales locations pays five times the price). However, 
a quantity discount could be installed for incentivising customers signing up more 
locations at once, as commodity arbitrage is not possible. 
 
Variable pricing aspect 'price x quantity': While the product bundles and the 
corresponding fees T1 and T2 should be able to target high and low demand customers 
based on their budgetary constraints and perceived utility of the product features. The 
variable pricing aspect p x q can further differentiate between high and low demand 
customers within the respective segment. When designing the dynamic pricing aspect 
the success of a loyalty campaign as well as the customer frequency could help to 
achieve a successful differentiation (see factors 'b' and 'c' above). 
 
quantity: The success of a loyalty campaign ('c') as well as customer frequency ('b') 
could both be covered by charging a price per 'redeemed loyalty cards'. It represents a 
quantitative aspect linked to the basic core function of the product (the more 
consumers/users applying for the loyalty program, the more cards redeemed) and a 
certain factor of quality and success at the same time (the more consumers/users redeem 
their cards, the more revenue was generated). Accordingly, it is assumed that high 
demand customers' willingness to pay correlates with the number of redeemed loyalty 
cards. Consequentially, smaller shops, with less customer frequency representing low 
demand customers, do also pay less in absolute terms because not as many loyalty cards 
will be redeemed.  
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price: As stated above, a price multiplied by the sum of all redeemed loyalty cards must 
be able to absorb the remaining consumer surplus (on top of T1 or T2) for both 
customer groups. For the low-demand customer group it therefore has to be high 
enough so a high performing low-demand customer would theoretically spend CHF 
894.90 at best and otherwise would switch in the higher product bundle B2 because it 
delivers higher utility. According to poinz in the top third of low demand customers 370 
cards are redeemed on average. These customers are smaller shops with rather low 
customer frequency but performing better than average (top third). Hence, a rounded 
amount of CHF 0.90 per redeemed card should be charged ((CHF 894 - CHF 550) / 370 
cards). As a result, one can derive a low demand pricing function of p = 550 + (0.90 x 
redeemed card) and a high demand function of p = 895 + (0.90 x redeemed cards). 
 
Illustration of the final pricing based on price discrimination theory 
To illustrate a final pricing structure one has to further estimate the frequency of a high 
performing high-demand customer (top third). According to poinz it is fair to assume 
that at a top third high demand customers locations twice as much loyalty cards (740) 
could be redeemed on average. Resulting in the pricing illustration in Figure 2 below. 
370 
Price 
CHF 0.90 / redeemed card 
740 
CHF 550 
Low demand 
 
CHF 895 
High demand 
 
CHF 665 
Variable fee 
CHF 335 
Variable fee 
CHF 895 + (0.90 x q) 
CHF 550 + (0.90 x q) 
Figure 2: Illustration of possible pricing model for poinz. 
Quantity (redeemed cards) 
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This illustrative example of two customers both high demanding for their respective 
customer group would thus lead to a rounded price of CHF 885 (CHF 550 + CHF 335) 
for a low demand customer and CHF 1'560 (CHF 895 + CHF 665) for a high demand 
customer. While the fixed fees T1 and T2 are constant (in Figure 2 labelled as 'Low 
demand' and 'High demand') the 'Variable fee' changes in absolute price based on the 
'Quantity' of redeemed cards and would be charged on top of it.  
 
However, even though this pricing structure enables poinz to differentiate between 
consumer groups in an effective way, by focusing on (marginal) costs as a base for T1 
and T2, and not on an approximated minimal willingness to pay, the risk of excluding a 
certain customer group exists.  
 
Example of a possible exclusion of a specific customer group  
As an example, Shops introducing a loyalty card for a low priced product (e.g. 10 times 
coffee or croissant get the 11th for free) could be excluded because of the absolute 
amounts of the pricing (mainly T1 and p). More precisely, problems could occur if the 
costs for free products handed out (e.g. coffee or croissant), the full fee for redeemed 
loyalty cards (p x q) and the yearly fee (T1) exceed a possible profit made through 
poinz. To further clarify this issue the following terms are assumed: - Revenue through poinz (R) = points distributed to customers (pd) x selling price 
of product (sp) - Additional revenue through poinz in % (aR) - Cost for free distributed products (fp) = cost price ((selling price - gross margin) 
x (points distributed x share of redeemed cards in %)) - Cost for redeemed cards = 0.9 x redeemed cards (q) 
 
One could assume a rational customer buys poinz when at least: 
(R x aR) - T - fp  - (0.9 x q) > 0 holds.  
 
To state a calculatory example in the case of a bakery (which could be a low-demand 
customer according to low profit margins) the following variables are assumed constant: 
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pd = 28501, aR = 10%2, rate of redeemed cards = 10%2, q = 19, gross margin = 
20%3  
1 Low-demand customer distributing every business day 15 points (coffees) 
2 Assumptions according to poinz 
3 (Schweizer Bäcker-Confiseurmeister-Verband, 2015) 
 
It would lead to:   
(2850sp x 0.1) - 550 - (sp x (1 - 0.2) x 285)  - 257 > 0 and sp = CHF 5.10. 
 
Hence, one could conclude that if the price of the product (with the assumptions made) 
falls below CHF 5.10 poinz would have to either lower their prices to stay a rational 
choice for this customer group or decide not to serve it.  
 
On the other hand, if the price of a product is held constant at CHF 3.50 (for example a 
coffee) and the customer is considered to be a high-demand / low- demand bakery with 
multiple sales locations the following assumptions: 
sp= CHF 3.50 aR = 10%, rate of redeemed cards = 10%, q = 19, gross margin = 
20%, discount for multiple sales locations = 20% 
 
Which would lead to: 
 (3.50pd x 0.1) - 716 or 440 - (3.5 x (1 - 0.2) x 0.1pd) - (0.9 x 0.1pd) > 0 and t pd 
= 3977 or 2444. 
 
In this case, a high- demand customer offering low-priced products at CHF 3.50 need to 
sell at least 3'977 products per location (21 every business day) and the low-demand 
customer 2'444 (13 every business day) over poinz. As a consequence, poinz would not 
only have to decide if this specific low-demand customer group should be excluded but 
be aware that 'high-demand' customers with this campaign pattern (e.g. large bakeries) 
most probably choose the low-demand product bundle or no bundle at all if the 
frequency per location is low. For further analysis it is assumed that this customer group 
plays a minor role (small shop and low priced products as well as large shop with not 
enough customer frequency) as it does not seem attractive for poinz neither in terms of 
profitability nor regarding the generated downloads to serve it. 
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Theoretical limitations and note on the possibility of three-part tariffs 
Certain limiting factors as well as additional boundaries applied above are highlighted 
in this section. However, a deeper investigation and reflexion regarding the impact or 
origin of the limitations will be undertaken in the last chapter of this work.  
Firstly, classical price discrimination theory seems not to consider any strategic time 
bound aspects. The pricing of a start-up for example could be influenced by the attempt 
to further expand internationally or foster the monopolistic market position for 
anticipating new start-ups or products. However, insights from the theory of dynamic 
pricing or discrimination under oligopolistic market situations were not further 
considered, as it would have gone beyond the scope of this work. 
Secondly, two-part tariffs are not the only option to make use of discrimination of the 
second degree. Especially the option of 'three-part tariffs' is being discussed in recent 
research and directly compared to two-tariff systems (Lambrecht, Seim, & Skiera, 
2007). Multiple sources show that under certain circumstances 'three-part tariffs' can 
result in an optimized pricing structure compared to two part tariffs (Ascarza, 
Lambrecht, & Vilcassim, 2012). The implications of these results were however not 
further considered in this work, as the scientific consensus, compared to the theory of 
two part tariffs, seems not yet to be fully established. Comparing differing opinions 
about the two options, in different scientific context and linking it to the pricing of 
poinz, would represent a topic on its own and therefore go beyond the goal of this work.   
Lastly, the basic assumption of rationality of the standard economic theory underlying 
price discrimination could have a limiting impact. It is assumed that every customer has 
a pre-set price level based on a pure rational analysis (willingness to pay), which cannot 
be further expanded. Especially in the case of poinz where further discrimination could 
be applied by visiting customers separately, a price increase beyond the willingness to 
pay could yield opportunities. However, the prospect theory, chosen to complement this 
pricing, is attaching to this problem set. 
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2.2. Creating a pricing through prospect theory 
First, to fully understand the application in this chapter it is important to note that the 
prospect theory should not be considered a mere theory for 'pricing strategies'. 
However, its findings changed the perception in purchasing decision situations 
sustainably. Where the price discrimination theory in the former chapter helped to 
structure a pricing framework, the prospect theory will rather reflect on how the 
perception of the set prices and products could influence a customers' choice. For that 
reason, the subsequent analysis is intended to be rather complementing and not 
opposing to the pricing stated in chapter 2.1.3. Therefore, after drawing the scope of the 
theory, the pricing form 2.1.3 will directly be used as a base and optimized through 
prospect theory in chapter 2.2.3. However, after defining the theoretical boundaries of 
the prospect theory in 2.2.1, a selection of derived sub-concepts, namely 'Framing' and 
'Anchoring', is revealed in 2.2.2. and explained for further use. However, certain 
theoretical implications of the theory will question and directly oppose assumptions 
made in standard economics fundamentally (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979, p. 263). 
Nevertheless, as the focus of this work explicitly lies in a possible practical application 
it is considered feasible to overcome certain contradictions. 
 
2.2.1. Theoretical framework of the prospect theory in the context of pricing  
The prospect theory presented by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) implies that consumer 
behave not as rational as the standard economic theory assumed they would. When 
consumers face choices they seem to prefer security to risk, weight losses compared to 
perceived gains and focus in decision situations on certain aspects more then on others 
and hence have different preferences when choices are presented in varied forms 
(Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979, p. 263). However, this contradicts with the assumption 
of the standard economic model where decisions assumed to be made considering all 
necessary information for maximizing the own utility (Mankiw & Taylor, 2014, p. 126). 
For poinz this implies that certain instruments could be applied to raise the customers' 
willingness to pay and maximize profit beyond pre assumed levels. These aspects are 
theoretically contradictory to the hypothesis applied under 2.1.3. but however do not 
limit a further pricing optimization in practice. 
	 26 
 
For structuring a pricing for poinz in a way it could influence the willingness to pay of 
its customers, the role of the 'reference point' in prospect theory must be understood and 
thus described. According to Kahneman and Tversky the starting point of a customers 
decision is a subjective reference point from which gains and losses of the to be taken 
decision are evaluated (the reference point is where the x-axis and the y-axis intersect in 
Figure 3) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453f). As mentioned in the introduction it is 
important to note that losses are perceived stronger then possible gains. This is 
expressed by the steep, convex curve (loss), compared to the flatter, concave curve 
(gain) in figure 3. The concavity entails risk-aversion and convexity risk-seeking 
respectively (Kahneman & Tversky, 1983, p. 342). The understanding of this aspect is 
the theoretical base for the selection and application of derived sub-theories hereafter. 
 
2.2.2. Selection of sub-theories and definition of the respective theoretical scope  
The prospect theory gave rise to additional concepts, which can influence pricing 
design. Accordingly, the selection of sub-theories for this work is mainly related to their 
practicability for pricing models. Why it is considered to be practicable will be stated in 
the respective section below. Each theory will shortly be explained and the boundaries 
Figure 3: A hypothetical value function (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 454) 
Value  
Losses Gains 
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for the application for poinz will be shown. The two selected theories will be analysed 
separately from each other because of potential interrelationships that would otherwise 
not be visible to the reader. Therefore, the translation of the insights into specific 
pricing optimizations for poinz follows, after a short summery, in the next chapter 
where prospect theory and price discrimination will be combined.			
Framing 
The scope of the scientific research concerning the psychological elements of framing is 
too broad to be fully considered in this work. Furthermore, applying an interpretation of 
certain psychological elements of the theory on to the pricing of poinz could not be 
considered a scientific approach, as the margin of interpretation is too large. The focus 
is thus mainly laid on concrete insights linked to pricing and discount policy found in 
research. On one hand the insights presented by Kahneman & Tversky in the position 
paper 'Choices, Values and Frames' in 1983 will be analysed (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1983) and a short description of the theory alongside with a list of practical insights will 
be stated below. On the other hand, in the section thereafter, findings based on the same 
practical focus but from complementary research papers will be listed to extend the 
insights from Kahneman & Tversky.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that the theory of framing partially contradicts with 
the theoretical assumptions of purely rational agents in the standard economic theory as 
well (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453). A note on the difficulties with theoretical 
contradictions when focusing on theory only will be stated in the discussion in the last 
chapter. 
 
The concept of frames initially formulated by Kahneman and Tversky showed that 
choices vary when presentation or display (the frame) of the to be made choice changes 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453). The reason why choices differ when frames 
change is related to the non-linear relationship between losses and gains shown in figure 
3 and the mental process underlying it. Among others, framing can be applied to 
influence the willingness to pay through changing wordings on package labels, 
changing locations of price displays or switching between absolute and relative 
discounts. However, as poinz is not selling any physical product in retail or directly 
online the insights will be mainly used for reflecting on how to bundle different pricing 
aspects, how to present it in sales presentations and how to apply it in discount policy. 
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Following Tversky & Kahneman (1983) four aspects, which could impact the pricing 
design or discount policy of poinz, have been worked out. A short linkage to a possible 
use for poinz in practice follows each aspect. However, it will be in chapter 2.2.3 and 
2.3. where specific measures for the pricing are formulated.  
 
1. People rather consider price discounts in relative terms (comparing the price of 
the good to the discounted amount) than in absolute terms. This implies that an 
absolute discount on a large price has less of an effect then the same discounted 
amount on a lower price (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 459). 
Poinz should consider differing their discount policy depending on the price level of 
each product bundle. 
 
2. Making decisions people consider a transaction utility representing the 
difference between the offered price of the product and a pre-set reference price 
(Thaler, 1999, p. 188; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 456). The higher the 
transaction utility the better the customers' evaluation of the deal.  
The frame of the pricing should be in line with a reference price poinz would want to 
pre-set. However, the whole scientific discussion on what influences the reference point 
cannot be fully considered here. The focus is therefore mainly laid on anchors. The 
concept of 'anchors' will be further explained in the subsequent section 'Anchoring'. 
 
3. As losses are perceived worse than gains calculated from the previously adapted 
reference point people rather forego a discount than pay a surcharge on top of 
the price (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 456). 
Instead of discounts alone poinz should consider framing it as costs if a certain 
customer behaviour should be promoted (for example a fast decision).   
 
4. People can oversee favourable options if the choice is framed as two separate 
choices (when considering X also getting Y) compared to an alternative option 
where no additional mental effort is needed (getting Z = (X-Y)) (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981, p. 455). 
If poinz is investing in discounts and/or special bundle prices simplicity should be 
preferred to rather complex and large constructs with multiple discounts.  
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Even though, it is stated above that certain aspects of framing were left out when 
lacking a direct link to pricing, depriving the 'endowment effect' needs further 
explanation. Mainly because the endowment effect is assumed to yield customers 
considering sunk costs and thus could have been considered for the pricing of poinz 
(for example to implement trial periods for the product, to trigger perceived sunk 
costs). However, according to Kahneman (2012) the endowment effect mainly applies 
to goods linked to leisure or personal enjoyment (Kahneman, 2012, p. 294). Poinz is 
not assumed to be such a product and hence not necessarily exposed to the effect.  
 
Listed below a selection of additional suggestions for price and discounting frames 
based on current research, which could be used for pricing optimization: 
 
5. Savings on a product bundle with less items (compared to more items) and a 
shown deal in percentage (compared to absolute terms) have a high impact on 
perceived savings (Krishna, Briesch, Lehmann R., & Yuan, 2002, p. 106). 
Referring to this study poinz could implement bundles with little complexity and could 
display percentage deals in the product presentation from time to time. Furthermore, it 
is in line with point number 1 and 4 in the previous section. 
 
6. Higher priced products should be discounted in percentage and lower priced 
products in absolute values (Chen, Monroe, & Lou, 1998, p. 369f.). 
If poinz can differ between a rather high and rather low priced product offering this 
aspect has to be considered. Furthermore it is consistent with point 1 in the previous 
section. 
 
7. Drip pricing (where the full price sequentially unfolds) seems to lead to higher 
paid prices as well as time bound offerings (price is valid until date X) (Fletcher, 
Huck, & Wallace, 2010, p. 78f). 
Poinz could adapt to these strategies and combine them. Going through the pricing 
step by step could simulate the drip pricing. The time-bound limitation of the offer 
could be used complementary when limiting the validity of an offer. Furthermore, it 
finds support in point 4 in the previous section. 
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The listed aspects 1 to 7 will be reflected on and combined with findings from section 
'Anchoring' in the summary at the end of this chapter to present a more integrated 
picture.  	
Anchoring 
Similar to the previous section the theory of 'Anchoring' is placed in the intersection 
between economics and psychology. The practical focus of this work however let the 
considered sources be rather focused on research related to anchoring in pricing and not 
further considering the behavioural aspects behind it. However, as an introduction to 
this section it helps to understand the psychological framework behind the effects 
introduced by Kahneman & Tversky (1974). After the introduction, the findings from 
mentioned practical research will be listed and linked to the respective goal to design 
and optimize a pricing in chapter 2.3.  
 
The concept of anchors is loosely described as the consideration "of a particular value 
for an unknown quantity before estimating that quantity" while the number estimated 
then stays "close to the number people considered" in the first place (Kahneman, 2012, 
p. 119). Hence, the considered number acts as an 'anchor' for the guessed number. The 
interesting aspect for economics and pricing in particular is the fact that, and the way in 
which, an anchor can influence a customers reference point (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974, p. 1128) (see point 2 in the list in sub-chapter 'Framing'). An experiment showed 
that a group of real estate specialists with the task to estimate a price of a house stated a 
41% higher value when seeing a (fictitious) high asking price compared to the group 
seeing a (fictitious) low asking price before estimating it. No one of the experiment 
group however realized that they were influenced by the fictitious price when 
evaluating the value of the house (Kahneman, 2012, p. 124). This experiment 
exemplifies well where the potential for poinz would lie. If the reference point of an 
evaluation can be influenced beforehand the chance to increase the overall willingness 
to pay exists and poinz could consequently charge higher prices exists.  
 
To apply anchoring for the pricing of poinz, empirical research was consulted to 
identify effective anchoring possibilities. The intention was therefore not to balance 
scientific arguments on similar anchor possibilities but on selecting a variety of 
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different anchors to apply in the pricing design for poinz. Based on this approach five 
anchors were worked out to consider for further use: 
 
8. A price, which is displayed before presenting the actual price-level to a prospect, 
can influence his evaluation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1128). 
Price as anchor - poinz could work a product / price comparison into the presentation 
to set anchors before showing the pricing. This could happen for example in form of a 
comparison between similar products in the marketplace (of which prices would of 
course be higher than poinz). 
 
9. A random number (e.g. writing down a social security number) influenced the 
willingness to pay of a customer significantly (Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 
2003, p. 75f.) 
Random number as anchor - Poinz could consider using random numbers influencing 
the anchor of a potential client before the buying decision is made. This point is 
theoretically in line with point number one but related to random numbers and not price 
comparisons alone.  
 
10. A 'fake' product bundle representing an anchor (with a high price) where 
potential customers deviate the evaluation of the other bundles from can 
influence the customers' choice significantly (Ariely D. , 2008, p. 1ff.). 
Product bundle as anchor - If poinz would work a product bundle into the pricing only 
designed to set an anchor for customers to evaluate which bundle is suitable could bend 
the customers' choice towards a preferred option. 
 
11. Customers evaluate bundles based on a product within the bundle, which is 
considered desirable to them (anchor). The evaluation of the product bundle is 
then undertaken in sequential order with the anchor product rated on top (Yadav, 
1994, p. 346ff.) 
Product within bundle as anchor - Using a certain product (or product feature in case 
of poinz) as an anchor could be done through focusing a sales presentation on 
influencing the customers' evaluation towards a certain feature and a more expensive 
bundle respectively.  
	 32 
12. Transgressive (or regressive) pricing shows a positive impact on willingness to 
pay by posting a moderate over- or under-pricing in respect to the willingness to 
pay. Here, the price itself acts as an anchor (Wathieu & Bertini, 2007, p. 120ff.). 
Price of the product itself as anchor - Wathieu and Bertini suggest using transgressive 
(regressive) pricing when the product is linked to rather high (low) perceived quality 
and low (high) cost of thinking. The model suggest that differentiating firms should use 
"overpricing" (transgressive pricing) to trigger thoughts of customers in their favour 
and support the thought process with e.g. trial periods (low costs of thinking). The 
regressive pricing entails the opposite (cheap price, high cost of thinking) (Wathieu & 
Bertini, 2007, p. 120ff.). Poinz could work with both customer groups targeting on one 
hand a high demand customer with a rather more expensive product bundle and on the 
other hand targeting a low demand customer with a price below his willingness to pay.  
 
2.2.3. Application of framing and anchoring for a pricing in practice 
In this section the worked out aspects above are broken down, combined and listed in a 
sequential order based on a hypothetical sales meeting starting with the product 
presentation and ending with a possible discount policy simulating a practical situation 
where pricing matters (reference to related argument above in brackets): 
 
Product presentation 
The sales presentation should contain common anchors (random numbers and prices) to 
set a high reference point for pricing negotiations. The goal is to maximize the potential 
customers transaction utility and as a result increase the possibility for a higher 
willingness to pay (2, 9, 10). Additionally, the product feature, which represents the 
main selling point (which should therefore be part of the high demand product bundle), 
should be the main focus when presenting (12). 
 
Pricing and composition of product bundles 
In general, all product bundles should be created in a simple and easy to understand 
manner (4, 5). The only exception could be a slightly overpriced product bundle 
representing also higher costs to deliver (perceived quality) (13). It should state the 
highest value and should be shown first when unfolding the pricing of poinz (drip 
pricing) in sequential order (e.g. base price first + additional pricing aspects) (2, 8, 9, 
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10). It could be accompanied by a product bundle, which is slightly more expensive but 
with no significant added value. This 'fake' bundle could act as an anchor where 
customers adjust their choice from, guiding the selection towards the (second) 
expensive option. However, a rather simple (less items) and cheap bundle could target 
low-demand customers. The price set could lie right under their willingness to pay (4, 5, 
11, 13). 
 
Discount policy 
Discounts could be linked to a certain time constraint (e.g. time for deciding if it should 
be bought or not) and granted in absolute values for low priced values (e.g. 100 CHF) 
and in percentage values for high priced products (1, 5, 7, 8). However, when the cheap 
product bundle does already mark the lowest possible price it could be framed as a 'now 
or never' price when offering it and 'surcharged' with a certain absolute value for an 
additional amount of time (e.g. week). Seasonal promotions in per cent on the higher 
priced products could be implemented from time to time to leverage sales (1, 3, 7, 8, 
13).  
 
The subsequent chapter will combine the here formulated results with the results from 
chapter 2.1.  
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2.3. Results - Combining price discrimination and prospect theory for a 
pricing in practice 
The following chapters combine the results from the pricing structure created based on 
price discrimination theory, anchoring and framing. As the aspects of anchoring and 
framing also contain aspects linked to the pricing appearance the result is presented in 
form of a sales presentation. Further explanations are stated below the respective slide:  
  
Figure 4: The main focus of the presentation is laid on the product feature mainly 
differing high from low demand customers (communication function). It guides 
potential customers towards evaluating the attractiveness of the product bundle based 
on the communication function. As this function is available in the high demand 
bundle only a price markup of at least 62.5% becomes more reasonable for the 
potential customer. 
Figure 4: The communication feature is used as an anchor preluding the differentiation between high and low 
customer groups. 
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Figure 5: The fact that random numbers influence the anchor of potential customers 
allows download figures (or other numbers) to pre-set anchors above for example CHF 
2000. If the customer adopts this anchor subconsciously the transaction value, 
representing the difference between price paid and anchor, increases. This causes a rise 
in willingness to pay and maximizes the chance of customers choosing the highest 
product, hence reducing the risk of demand transferability.  																
 
Figure 6: In addition to random numbers cost comparisons help to further set the 
potential customers reference point for example above CHF 2000. 		
Figure 5: Random numbers acting as an anchor setting a high reference number in the customers' perception. 
Figure 6: A price comparison acting as an anchor to set a high reference price in the customers' perception. 
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Figure 7: The two defined product bundles B1 and B2 and the respective prices T1 and 
T2 from chapter 2.1. are complemented with a third 'fictitious' package (CHF 1'295) 
acting as an anchor. This product bundle appears slightly more valuable because of an 
automated report (could be any non significantly value adding feature) but however 
costs notably more (could be any notable amount above T2). It is assumed that potential 
customers subconsciously use this anchor for comparison. Comparing the two high 
demand packages the 'standard' suddenly appears to be the obvious choice - which is 
exactly what poinz would want them to choose in the first place. A time bound discount 
in per cent further incentivises the customer for choosing that option. The time given is 
rather long (month) as the cost of thinking should not be raised any further. However, if 
the decision is not taken within the respective month the higher price (compared to CHF 
895 in chapter 2.1.) counts, which would represent a slight overpricing. This induces a 
perceived quality aspect according to the principles of transgressive pricing. 
Furthermore the 'discount' on the low-demand package is not labelled as such but as a 
surcharge. If the customer does not decide within a week, he or she will pay an absolute 
surcharge of CHF 100 for a longer thinking period (CHF 650) aligning to the principles 
of regressive pricing. As poinz is intended to visit and negotiate with every customer 
the surcharge could be argued towards the customer as administrational expenses for 
poinz for unnecessary effort. However, in reality this charge is not linked to any real 
additional costs. According to the business model, the prices will be charged per year. 
In addition to that, prices are charged per sales location to absorb consumer surplus of 
Figure 7: Final pricing suggestion based on price discrimination and prospect theory.  
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every existing location equally. However, quantity discounts in per cent are set to grant 
an attractive reduction when signing up multiple locations, which is applicable, as no 
commodity arbitrage is considered possible. Additional aspects like limiting messages 
or setting a smaller package for customers with low frequency and low-priced products 
(see chapter 2.1.) are not applied. On one hand because the customers decision-making 
process would become more complex and hence the evaluation of the attractiveness of 
different options become more difficult. And on the other hand because an even cheaper 
product bundle with no significant differentiation would increase the risk of demand 
transferability further (low-demand customers transferring into cheapest bundle). 
 
According to the pricing stated above the customers would pay base fee only and the 
variable fee p x q would be charged at the end of the contract period. However, if at the 
point of the purchasing decision remaining willingness to pay can be detected (e.g. high 
perceived transaction value) the poinz sales representatives could use additional 
products for absorbing customer surplus (e.g. merchandise goods, consulting, service 
package etc.). However, as the focus of this work lies in the pricing structure and not in 
expanding the product portfolio this aspect will no longer be discussed but marked as a 
possibility.  
	
2.4. Findings - Comparison between theory and practice  
This chapter will highlight differences between the suggested pricing and the status quo 
of poinz. First, a table acts as a clear representation of the differences between both 
pricing structures. The comparison is undertaken based on pricing components worked 
out in chapter 2.1. and 2.2. Second, the main differences are further explained and split 
into 'similarities' and 'differences'. Furthermore, it is important to note that this 
comparison and the respective findings answer the research question stated in the 
introduction, asking for differences between the practical pricing and the theory based 
pricing. Furthermore, it is the base for detecting missed business potential and enabling 
a reflection on it in the discussion thereafter.  
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Comparison  
 
Suggested pricing components based on theory 
 
 
Current 
pricing poinz 
 
Theoretical 
pricing 
 
1. Price discrimination 
 
 
✓ 
 
✓ 
1.1. First-degree price discrimination  ✗ ✗ 
1.2. Second-degree price discrimination ✓ ✓ 
1.2.1 Two-part tariff ✗ ✓ 
1.3 Third-degree price discrimination ✗ ✗ 
1.4 Quantity discount ✓ ✓ 
 
2. Prospect theory 
 
 
 
 
2.1. Combining relative and absolute discount ✗ ✓ 
2.2. Using surcharges instead of discounts ✗ ✓ 
2.3. Low complexity of pricing structure (few 
items) 
✗ ✓ 
2.4. Make use of 'drip pricing' ✗ ✓ 
2.5. Make use of 'time bound offerings' ✓ ✓ 
2.6. Anchoring with random numbers ✗ ✓ 
2.7. Anchoring with price comparisons ✗ ✓ 
2.8. Anchoring with 'fake' product bundle ✗ ✓ 
2.9. Product within bundle as anchor ✓ ✓ 
2.10. Transgressive pricing ✓ ✓ 
2.11. Regressive pricing ✓ ✗ 
 
Table 2: Comparison between the constructed pricing based on theory and the status quo in practice. 
 
In the following comparison the numbers in brackets reference to the pricing aspect 
used in the table 1 to 2.11. The italic words indicate certain clusters, which help to 
structure the findings in the section thereafter.  
 
Similarities 
1. Poinz does engage in price discrimination with different prices set for packages 
with no differences in cost (1). 
2. No pricing makes use of perfect price discrimination strategy charging n 
different prices of n different customers. However, both theory and practice 
suggest in this context to visit customers on site to better detect the willingness 
to pay and act on it for optimizing the discrimination strategy (1.1.). 
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3. Both pricings make use of the second degree of price discrimination 
constructing packages where consumers with a demand price higher than x buy 
for x and all with a demand price lower than x but higher than y buy y (1.2).  
4. No pricing makes use of clear third degree price discrimination. Even though 
certain exogenous signals were used to construct the product bundles. It is not 
the case that for each customer group a new package is constructed and offered 
(1.3.).  
5. Prices are charged per location with a quantity discount in per cent to 
discriminate and differentiate high from low demand customers (1.4.). 
6. To incentivise customers for a fast decision poinz also applies time bound 
discounts (2.5.).  
7. Poinz, equal to the pricing suggested based on theory, uses the 'communication 
feature' as anchor and primary differentiator between low and high priced 
packages, hence low and high demand customers (2.9.).  
8. Both pricings set a product bundle with a high price compared to the lowest 
product bundle indicating a certain 'overpricing'. Especially the current pricing 
of poinz established a more expensive pricing with a 'communication mandate', 
which is not considered clear price discriminating, but could be seen as a quality 
component in line with suggestions of transgressive pricing. If however this 
product bundle is set too high or the composition of the product features is 
wrong risk increases for demand transferability (2.10). 
 
Differences 
1. Poinz does not make use of a two-part tariff. Hence, because the dynamic 
pricing mechanism found in two part tariffs is missing, they could miss out on 
consumer surplus. Furthermore, the only way for poinz to prevent demand 
transferability is either the sales representatives' ability to evaluate the 
willingness to pay correctly or the hope that customers make the rational right 
product choice.  
Nonetheless, one variable aspect (p x q) for absorbing additional consumer 
surplus can be detected in the 'Standard' package when a customer exceeds the 
amount of 3000 messages. This could be considered a three-part tariff. However, 
even though the usage of messages by customers choosing this product bundle 
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does indicate certain willingness to pay it does not clearly differentiate high 
from low demand customers within that group. The marketing strategy of a high-
demand customer could for example simply not further rely on the 
communication feature (but on E-Mail Marketing) and therefore escape the 
discrimination.  
Additionally, the dynamic pricing aspect (p x q) present in the theory based 
pricing does also impact opportunities during the contract period. It helps to 
discriminate customers automatically without further action from poinz. 
However, with the current pricing of poinz the only chance compensating for it 
would be if poinz acts proactively recognizing additional willingness to pay or 
the customer is switching proactively from one package to another. The 
suggested composition of p x q linked to 'redeemed cards' could therefore reduce 
cost and risk for absorbing additional consumer surplus (1.2.1). 
2. Poinz does only use discounts in per cent, which according to the theory loose 
attractiveness on their lower amount bundles ('light' & 'budget') (2.1.). 
3. Only the theory based pricing uses the strategy of applying a surcharge instead 
of a discount to guide the customers' perception towards a buying decision 
(2.2.). 
4. Comparing both pricings the theory based pricing is less complex with only 
three packages and three components (loyalty, communication, variable price). 
In comparison, the practical pricing has four packages with multiple product 
features within each bundle increasing the complexity notably for the customer 
when deciding on the different options. This increases the risk of missing out on 
consumer surplus by demand transferability or no purchase decision at all. 
Moreover, the rising complexity could be a sign of intuitive adjustments of 
pricing increasing complexity with every further aspect (2.3.).   
5. Based on the information given in the introduction it seems poinz does not make 
use of 'drip pricing' (2.4.).  
6. Based on the information given in the introduction it seems poinz does not make 
use of random numbers as anchors. Missing out on the possibility to establish a 
high transaction value and increase the willingness to pay, hence revenue (2.6.). 
7. Based on the information given in the introduction it seems poinz does not make 
use of a 'price comparison' as anchor. Missing out on the possibility to establish 
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a high transaction value and increase the willingness to pay, hence revenue 
(2.7.). 
8. It seems unclear if poinz also established certain bundles to only guide the 
customer towards a certain product. However, as every product contains 
multiple value adding features it does not seem to be the driver behind it. 
Therefore, poinz is considered to not make use of anchoring through 'fake' 
product bundles (2.8.). 
9. Only poinz positions a product bundle, which is possibly below the customers' 
willingness to pay. Furthermore, it could include certain customer groups, which 
the suggested pricing excludes (e.g. low-priced products). When the mere 
acquisition of customer locations or App downloads attached to it enjoy a 
strategic importance this bundle could also be strategically justified. However, 
the price of CHF 390 is below the customer acquisition cost of poinz (CAC) 
thus unprofitable when selling at this price. Furthermore, the low price could 
additionally increase the risk of demand transferability ('light' customers 
transferring into 'budget') when no significant differentiation is apparent (2.11).  
	
Findings 
Poinz does successfully apply price discrimination to a certain degree differing between 
high and low demand customers through differentiated product bundles. Furthermore, 
discrimination is intensified by negotiating prices with customers directly. This means 
that the iterative process of pricing design led to an outcome which attempts to 
maximize profits by making use of the digital nature of the product and the agility of a 
small company. The different bundles target different customer segments based on 
experience and applied feedback. Therefore, without being aware of the theory, poinz 
intuitively applied aspects of the first (individual negotiation), second degree 
(customers self select bundles, three part tariff in the 'standard' package) and third 
degree price discrimination (different product bundles based on exogenous signals).  
 
However, the iterative process raised the complexity of the pricing noticeably and in 
combination with a missing variable pricing aspect increases the risk of demand 
transferability and therefore missed consumer surplus. The attempt to absorb remaining 
consumer surplus by charging a price per message for the communication feature seems 
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not to be an effective instrument. The goal to successfully price discriminate is thus 
solely depending on the ability of the start-ups sales representatives at the point of sale 
or during the contract period. This issue raises costs, increases the dependability on their 
sales staff and hurts the scalability of the business. Furthermore, aspects of 'framing' and 
'anchoring' are mostly not applied possibly missing out on additional revenue beyond 
the rational considerations of the customer.  
 
3. Discussion  
This last chapter reflects on the conducted research in chapter two partially from a more 
subjective point of view. The research question, asking for potentially missed business 
opportunities in practice, is considered to be answered best by poinz directly in chapter 
3.1., putting the findings in 2.4. in the start-ups current business context. Thereafter, in 
chapter 3.2., the reflection on the applied method helps to further asses if the approach 
was considered suitable and if it could be applicable beyond this thesis. The last part 
describes possible opportunities attaching to the undertaken research. 	
3.1. Answering the research question from the perspective of poinz 
We, as poinz, were not aware that we are actively engaging in price discrimination 
already to optimize our profit. The use of price discrimination practices was 
retrospectively mainly based on the nature of our business (digital product). However, 
as we were not aware of it we were also unable to leverage the insights of the strategy in 
our favour. Our pricing was, as described in the introduction, mainly created by a short 
market research in 2012 and hardly questioned ever since. The inability to adjust was 
also due to a rapidly growing customer base, which would have led to difficulties and 
higher costs when the pricing should have been adjusted fundamentally. The pricing 
structure was therefore, over time, only slightly adjusted by adding additional product 
bundles, raising or lowering prices marginally or shifting product features from one 
bundle to another. Changes were mainly based on the interpretation of feedback of our 
sales representatives and customers. This resulted among others, as detected in the 
findings, in increasing complexity of our pricing structure. In addition to that, demand 
transferability did take place. However, we were unable to identify it as such and link 
the problem to our pricing. Instead we connected it to the inability of our sales 
representatives to sell the right product bundle to the right customer. Furthermore, the 
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feedback process, initially meant to optimize the pricing, did also not bring out the 
awareness of the real issue, as customers seldom decline an offer revealing the true 
reason for the negative decision (e.g. budget constraints). It therefore led us to further 
invest in the training of our sales representatives, rather than questioning the pricing 
structure in general. As a result, if sales representatives were trained successfully, the 
risk of loosing their abilities to detect the maximum willingness to pay or sell the right 
product bundle (hence prevent demand transferability) became critical. This resulted in 
higher cost in terms of hiring, staff training and reduced the scalability of the business 
in general. Hence, the second part of the twofold research question formulated in the 
introduction in 1.1., specifically if the identified differences could detect additional 
business potential for poinz, can hereby be affirmed.  
Adjusting our pricing to the suggested structure could reduce demand transferability, 
which helps us to potentially sell more often at higher prices. A dynamic pricing aspect 
would further reduce the dependability on our sales representatives and thus increase 
the scalability of our business while lowering staff expenditures. 
Nevertheless, the topic of the work was the pricing structure and operational as well as 
strategic aspects (e.g. market expansion strategy, planned product development, actual 
market demand etc.) were mainly excluded. This triggers follow-up tasks for us when 
making use of the gained insights. Namely the adaptability of our customer base to a 
new pricing scheme, the monetary impact on the initial contractual sum and the 
influence on the overall business strategy.  
 
3.2. Reflection on research method 
The applied method was laid out on the goal to not only transparently reveal every 
analytical step but also to simulate pricing structuring in practice, not knowing much 
about the demand structure of its customers. However, this approach led to the difficulty 
to choose which information from existing demand to exclude and which to integrate. 
Including certain data from past sales numbers, may have led to a more sound 
estimation of demand structures. However, all (wrong) decisions and business practices 
poinz made in the past would have automatically been included too and the results 
diluted. The method did therefore bring along less calculative insights but enabled a 
more objective contrast to the status quo hence clearer insights. Nevertheless, if poinz 
would want to apply the worked out pricing, the numbers should be tested in practice, 
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existing data and sales numbers compared and other instruments like conjoint analysis 
for estimating the willingness to pay considered.  
Furthermore, the chosen theories and defined boundaries did influence the outcome of 
the pricing itself notably. This aspect seems obvious but gains importance in the context 
of this work. The problematic of inexperience in pricing design does also apply to the 
choice of theories and respective boundaries to create pricing guidelines and a sound 
comparison. If the 'wrong' theories are chosen and the boundaries set at the 'wrong' 
places, the scientific approach does also not help to optimize the companies’ business 
practices. For example, did the assumptions that poinz is an effective monopoly led to 
the choice of the price discrimination theory and hence influenced the pricing 
fundamentally. If a business assesses the overall situation wrong, the pricing would be 
created incorrect too. To prevent these mistakes the judgement of an expert could 
represent a starting point for a scientific pricing analysis in practice.  
Furthermore, the approach of creating a pricing on theory alone must also be 
questioned. If the focus of this work had been laid on a theoretical exercise only, certain 
assumptions underlying the theories would have made it hard to continue. For example 
in the world of rational agents, underlying price discrimination theory, could 
consequentially the concepts of 'anchoring' or 'framing' not exist. Hence, the practical 
focus of this work did on one hand break with certain theoretical rules but on the other 
hand enabled both theories to influence a business in practice. It therefore can be 
concluded that strictly focusing on theory alone would also not have been an applicable 
path for entrepreneurs. In accordance with that insight, the pragmatic combination of a 
practical approach within clear theoretical boarders states a valid alternative. Hence, the 
method applied in this thesis can be seen as an applicable possibility to reflect and 
question pricings already established in practice. The existing pricing of poinz (or any 
other company) states a practical frame in which suitable theories, suggested by an 
expert, are able to challenge the structure fundamentally and unfold undetected business 
potential.  
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3.4. Follow-up 
In terms of poinz, aspects of the created pricing structure will be tested and applied in 
practice to potentially optimize profit. Additionally, the insights will help to prevent 
future mistakes and / or detect structural wrong doings in future pricing design. 
However, the missing time for young entrepreneurs to engage in a scientific analysis of 
this scope as well as the unawareness of missed business potential is probably not 
limited to poinz alone. The insights gained in this thesis could therefore also have a 
sustainable impact on other businesses too. Hence, focusing on optimizing pricing 
structures could be seen as a potential business opportunity. Not only in terms of 
consulting services but also - if the analytical process could be further automated - 
served as a scalable software service. Recent developments in 'Artificial Intelligence' 
and 'Machine Learning' could level the way to such a scalable solution. However, to 
further consider such a venture research in terms of real market demand, potential 
market size and existing competition would have to be undertaken.  
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